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This paper discusses the governance of political economy in areas of limited 
statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO) by focusing on the issue of state 
capture. By linking the notion of state capture to the idea of ALS, the paper 
investigates how a deterioration of governance can take place when the state fails 
to mediate the interests of the population vis-à-vis capital, thus favouring the 
personal gains and rent-seeking activities of the ruling class. Drawing on the 
cases of Libya and Tunisia, the paper will examine the extent to which processes 
of state capture dominate the political economy of countries of the EU’s southern 
neighbourhood (SN). It will place unique attention on the enabling conditions 
that generate state capture and assess how this process can produce risks or 
become a source of threat to the EU. In doing so, the paper will also reflect on the 
implications of the main findings when approaching the question of resilience 
and how state capture contributes to the wider conceptual discussion on ALS and 
CO in the SN. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper discusses the governance of political economy in areas of limited 
statehood (ALS)1 by focusing on the issue of state capture. Drawing on the cases of 
Libya and Tunisia in the EU’s southern neighbourhood (SN), it examines how state 
capture can produce risks or become a source of threat to the EU, presenting concrete 
challenges. The working paper will identify common themes across the two case 
studies while highlighting and preserving the specificities of each country. The 
paper links the notion of state capture to the idea of ALS by showing how a 
deterioration of governance can take place when the state fails to mediate the 
interests of the population vis-à-vis capital, thus favouring the personal gains and 
rent-seeking activities of the ruling class. Consequently, the process of state capture 
has important implications for the provision of governance and sources of resilience, 
negatively affecting the three identified sources of resilience: social trust, legitimacy, 
and institutional design.2 This is mainly due to the fact that, as the paper aims to 
                                               
1
  ALS are those areas in which central government authorities and institutions are too weak to set and 
enforce rules and/or do not control a monopoly on the means of violence (see Börzel and Risse 2018). 
2
  The first source, social trust, is referred to as “a cooperative attitude towards other people based on 
the optimistic expectation that others are likely to respect one’s own interests” (Draude et al. 2018, 
354). The second source refers to governance actors’ empirical legitimacy, understood as the social 
acceptance they enjoy among the governed population. The third source, institutional design, 
indicates the degree to which institutions are fit for purpose and able to help ensure effective 
governance and is a decisive marker of societal resilience (for more on resilience, see Cadier et al. 
2020). 










show, the process of state capture triggers the under-provision of basic public goods 
and services, resulting into a breakdown of governance (Börzel and Risse 2018). In 
fact, it reveals how economic practices can become a vehicle through which certain 
services are provided only for exclusive groups and how collective goods are 
transformed into private goods accessible only to those who pay for them or are 
distributed to those loyal to the ruling class and wealthy elites. 
The goal of the working paper is to present concrete findings while reflecting on the 
potential sources of threats and risks. The paper is divided in four main sections. The 
first one will discuss the central concept, state capture, from a conceptual level. The 
second and third parts will focus on the insights emerging from the cases of Libya 
and Tunisia.3 The last section will discuss the main findings.  
2. MAPPING THE CONCEPTS 
Generally, the term state capture is used to refer to the process by which private 
actors seize public institutions and processes to realize their personal interests in 
accumulating power and wealth (Grzymala-Busse 2008; Hellman et al. 2000; IMF 
2001). In this regard, the pursuit of rent-seeking activities is the most indicative 
practice of state capture; that is, an “activity broadly understood as non-productive or 
directly counterproductive efforts to capture ‘excess’ profit by creating or exploiting 
government regulation to avoid competition” (Heydemann 2004: 2). While the degree 
of rentierization of the economy can vary, what defines such activity is the gain of 
income derived from the ownership, possession, or control of scarce assets and under 
conditions of limited or no competition (Christophers 2019a). For instance, this can 
take place when private actors gain privileged access to national resources through 
public officials via informal practices, such as by bribery or corruption (Leitner and 
Meissner 2018). While this process allows private individuals to accumulate personal 
wealth and power, it also affects the accountability of several political processes, such 
as elections, fair distribution of goods and services, application of justice, and so on. 
Another term used to explain the structure allowing those processes of state capture 
is neo-patrimonialism. This is characterized by personal or clan rule whereby rent-
seeking political businessmen rely on the appropriation of state apparatuses and on 
informal patron-client relations to maintain control and achieve economic goals 
(Derluguian and Earle 2011). Processes of rent-seeking are institutionalized within 
state structures and political leaders ensure loyalty by distributing patronage and 
                                               
3
  The section discussing the Tunisian case is about to be published as an academic paper. For a 
longer and more articulate discussion on state capture in Tunisia, see Capasso, M. (forthcoming). 










licenses to seek rent (Markowitz 2013). In such contexts, the “redistributive effect of 
corruption serves as a legitimacy factor and a way to maintain the support of the 
elite and the bureaucracy” (Engvall 2017: 78). The consolidation of this logic based on 
multiple pacts has allowed for state functioning and stability, despite indicators of 
state weakness (Heathershaw and Schatz 2017), which some scholars have designated 
as the paradox of strong/weak states (Migdal 1988). Such activities are also referred to 
as crony capitalism, emphasizing predatory rent-seeking practices emerging from the 
mutually beneficial relationship between politicians and capitalists (Dana 2020) and 
constituting the basis of the ruling class. In other words, political authorities who 
make decisions do not simply lack the capacity to enforce them; rather, they pursue 
policies that, in turn, allow them to receive favours with great economic value. In 
order to capture the state, private actors rely on the systematic abuse and tailoring of 
formal institutions in order to accumulate power and wealth (Amundsen 1999). These 
forms of state capture are often associated with the presence of weak state 
institutions, corrupt ruling elites, processes of favouritism, and legal uncertainty. In 
fact, as the notion of ALS highlights, the distinction of public-private spheres is less 
applicable in countries where state institutions are so weak that government actors 
can easily exploit state resources for private purposes. In other words, the “implicit 
assumption of the public–private distinction according to which governments 
govern and private actors mind their own business, is often turned on its head in 
areas of limited statehood” (Risse 2018).4  
In the SN, the historical development of political economies presents numerous 
similarities with the eastern neighbourhood, and this is reflected in the associated 
debates. For instance, economies in the SN are often described as based on deals 
between political and economic elites rather than on the enforcement of clear and 
impartial rules (Diwan et al. 2019). In particular, Schlumberger (2008) has coined the 
term patrimonial capitalism to describe those economic regimes that rely largely on 
informal mechanisms to grant privileges to political allies and exclude potential 
opponents, including protecting monopoly rights, access to privatization offers, 
loans, government procurement, and public resources. At times, families associated 
                                               
4
  While not the objective of this report, it is important to point out that the ideas of state capture and 
crony capitalism are not uniquely applicable to ALS in the EU’s neighbourhoods. Rather, those 
processes are highly prevalent in the wider capitalist system and its various formations, i.e., state 
capitalism and neoliberalism. Their intensity and scale, however, vary and remain subject to debate. 
In neoliberal states, like the US or UK, recent studies have documented how capitalism tends to 
create rentier mechanisms, where powerful rentiers engineer ways to commodify politics, while 
politicians use rental income to indulge in clientelist practices that help them to stay in office 
(Standing 2016), for instance, via processes of financial rentierism (Christophers 2019a, 2019b; 
Mazzuccato 2018). 










with political regimes in one way or another came to dominate the private sector, in 
addition to exercising considerable control over public economic assets (Haddad 
2011). In this vein, the roll-back of the Arab state is linked to a failing process of 
liberalization. Clement and Springborg (2010), for instance, have argued that politics 
have driven economic development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
They outline a dialectic of globalization and colonization where third moment elites 
adapted to American hegemony in new ways when old elites had to choose between 
accepting or resisting such hegemony. Governance in the region has varied with 
states dominating the economy via socialist rhetoric and/or patronage relationships 
and crony capitalism. In their analysis, the room for capital accumulation by the 
private sector has ranged from very limited, in the case of so called “bunker states” 
(Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), to limited in “bully praetorian states” 
(Egypt, Tunisia, and Iran). It is substantial in the “globalizing monarchies” (GCC, 
Jordan, and Morocco), while only the “precarious democracies” in the region have 
granted more far-reaching autonomy to private sector actors (Lebanon, Israel, and 
Turkey). In other words, Arab states have not allowed their population to fully 
benefit from the process of economic globalization, distorting the inherent degree of 
dynamism of a market-oriented society. Instead, they opted for the creation of what 
Springborg (2020: 62–63) defines as ‘limited access orders’;5 that is, “systems in which 
order is based on political elites appropriating for themselves privileged control over 
parts of the economy, each getting some share of the rents”. In other words, the 
developmental model adopted by states in the SN became much less inclusive than in 
the past; the private sector became increasingly informal; and there was little trickle-
down to the disadvantaged. Nevertheless, while these interpretations provide very 
important and useful elements that explain the gradual emergence of dynamics of 
state capture in the SN, they fail to link those dynamics to wider geopolitical 
changes. 
To this end, Ali Kadri (2012, 2015) traces the gradual de-development of the MENA 
region to the consequences stemming from the military-ideological defeat of the 
project of Arab Socialism that followed the period of national independence in the 
1950s and 60s. While the state-led capitalist experience initially provided prosperous 
results for the population in the aftermath of colonization, military defeats by Israel 
in 1967 and 1973 provoked a wave of defeatism across the region (Kadri 2012, 2015, 
                                               
5
  Springborg borrows this term from the work of Douglass North (North et al. 2009), which 
distinguishes between limited and open access orders. While the former are based on clientelism and 
rent-seeking activities, the latter are driven by innovation and productivity, guaranteeing that all 
citizens have the right to form contractual organizations. 
 










2016). Many ruling elites not only dropped their egalitarian policies but became 
comprador classes of global financial capital, establishing a necrotrophic 
relationship with the national resources of their respective countries. While 
Heydemann (2004) describes these resulting structures as networks of privilege that 
emerged as the result of failed programs of economic reform that many states in the 
MENA undertook, Kadri instead stresses how the gradual incapacitation of the Arab 
state and the loss of its political autonomy over economic policies ultimately 
coincided with the aims of Washington Consensus reforms (Kadri 2016). With the 
adoption of liberalization policies, rulers linked their national resources to dollarized 
financial capital. While this process allowed US global primacy to continue, it 
required the pauperization of the national economies of countries in the Global 
South (Robinson 2011). The introduction of neoliberalism in the MENA region has 
resulted in the transformation from an even-distribution public sector-led economy 
with a paternalistic welfare state to a highly uneven private sector and a privately-
owned, public sector-led economy. In doing so, the ruling elites further renounced 
their traditional constituencies of farmers, workers, and low-level civil servants, 
seeking instead the political support of the business elite and the middle class (Matar 
2013). 
In this paper, I link the process of state capture to the notion of ALS by showing how 
a deterioration of governance can take place when the state fails to mediate the 
interests of labour vis-à-vis capital, thus favouring the personal gains and rent-
seeking activities of the ruling class. Drawing on the cases of Libya and Tunisia, I aim 
to show how the process of state capture emerges and the ways in which its 
governance mechanisms possess important implications for approaching resilience 
for EU member states.  
3. THE CASE OF LIBYA 
In the case of Libya, dynamics of state capture and the presence of rent-seeking elites 
have characterized the country’s political economy for a long time, but to various 
degrees (Vandewalle 2006). While the first decade of the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution 
witnessed the implementation of progressive and egalitarian policies that benefited 
the majority of the population, raising their life expectancy and providing affordable 
healthcare and housing; the military-ideological defeat of the Libyan Army in Chad, 
coupled with years of multilateral international sanctions, reversed these 
progressive gains (Naur 1986; Capasso 2020). These dynamics reached their apex 
during the last decade of the regime when the family of Qaddafi, and particularly his 
sons, managed to gain exclusive access to the most lucrative sectors of the economy, 
controlling resources and possessing privileges of which ordinary Libyans could 
only dream. All of Qaddafi’s children, in fact, occupied important financial, political, 










or military positions, which—in turn—translated into lucrative contracts and 
progressive accumulation of wealth.6 For instance, in 2008, Mutassim Qaddafi 
demanded $1.2 billion from the chairman of Libya’s national oil corporation, 
reportedly to establish his own militia (Shane 2011). The Panama Papers revealed that 
insiders of the regime had embezzled large sums of state-funds directed to build 
hospitals and public infrastructure in order to buy luxury properties in England and 
Scotland (Garside et al. 2016). While the corrupt practices of dividing the spoils of 
public wealth were institutionalized, unemployment had reached levels of 20–25% in 
the 2000s (St John 2008). Like many other countries in the SN, intra-elite divisions 
and growing societal discontent acted as a potent fuel for the civil strife of 2011. 
However, in the aftermath of the NATO-led military intervention and the fall of the 
Libyan regime (Capasso et al. 2019), the ensuing struggle over state institutions and 
the monopoly of violence intensified the struggle over rent-seeking activities among 
armed groups and warlords. In Libya, a case in point is the situation of Tripoli, where 
four militias have consolidated their position and established the basis for a 
functioning monopoly of violence (Lacher 2018). Although tensions between the four 
factions exist, they have shown solidarity when other armed groups have challenged 
their territorial control. From 2012 to early 2014, the primary source of finance for 
militias was funds that were specifically allocated to them by the defence and 
interior ministries that covered the salaries of individual militiamen. By inflating 
payrolls and operating expenditures, militia leaders and their political allies were 
able to accumulate wealth, which was then partially reinvested in heavy weapons and 
other capital-intensive equipment (Lacher and Cole 2014) for the war to continue. 
However, as state funding contracted in successive years, armed groups searched for 
other ways to finance themselves. Kidnappings soared in Tripoli during 2015 and 
2016, with the vast majority being financially motivated. During the same period, 
protection rackets emerged, with armed groups “taxing” local markets or private 
businesses in exchange for “security” (Chojnacki and Branović 2011). 
Furthermore, another important practice that emerged after 2011 is for militias based 
in Tripoli to threaten officials, such as those working in banks, to facilitate their 
monetary demands (Pack 2020). This situation heightened the widening gap between 
the official and black-market exchange rates as well as the worsening cash shortages 
in banks. In such situations, armed groups were able to profit and control state 
revenues in numerous ways. Firstly, banks sought protection from armed groups to 
manage cash distribution. The banks pay the groups “guarding” their branches, while 
                                               
6
  For a more detailed explanation of the Qaddafi siblings’ involvement in the country’s affairs, see 
Chorin (2012, 103–6). 










ordinary citizens face major difficulties accessing their salaries and savings (Lacher 
2018). What has allowed the militias to profit most, however, are fraudulent activities 
linked to obtaining letters of access to credit. At times, branch managers or 
businessmen have even initiated dealings with militias in order to obtain letters of 
credit. Such networks have been central to the emergence of a militia cartel in Tripoli 
(ibid.). The knowledge and connections of influential businesspersons and political 
operators gave Tripoli’s militias access to the resources they needed to expand across 
the capital. This suggests that one problem for a successful state capture is the wide 
and diversified range of actors involved in the network. Such activities also 
characterize the political economy of the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General 
Khalifa Haftar, which controls most of the country’s territory. Since 2016, the LNA 
has set up an institutional body called The Military Investment and Public Works 
Committee that undertakes predatory activities such as confiscating properties, 
extorting private economic actors, and taking control of public projects. Those 
practices were then followed by the imposition of monopolies over the smuggling of 
hard currency and refined fuel products, which further enabled the LNA to survive 
and maintain power by paying off its supporters (Noria Research 2019; Williams 2019). 
In both cases, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the type of dynamics that 
characterize these armed groups’ attempts to capture the state. The first structural 
factor that generated this cycle of predatory economy was the lack of monopoly of 
violence that followed the events of 2011; that is, the ALS and CO that arose with the 
involvement of different international actors via the initial provision of weapons 
and arms to the various groups aiming to overthrow Qaddafi (see Capasso et al. 2019). 
Following the fall of the regime, these armed groups relied on their acquired power 
and violence to take control of public infrastructure and private property and to 
extort and bring lucrative economies under their control. The third step involved the 
reinvestment of these funds in the security-military complex in order to solidify or 
maintain their power. Subsequently (and simultaneously), these same groups either 
imposed a monopoly over several export businesses, notably of refined petroleum 
products, or branched out to find alternative sources. The consequences of this 
process were largely detrimental to the population, since the provision of goods and 
services became tightly linked to people’s support for a certain armed group or gang. 
Therefore, when these groups became direct or indirect providers of state 
functions—including security, the economic costs associated with their actions were 
typically much higher and more detrimental to the population. Despite the diversity 
of its actors and factions, this new ruling class of warlords came into being and 
operates under a united political vision that has very close ties to the international 
powers sponsoring them, which aim to adjust democracy to enable them to remain in 
power and rule with an iron fist. 










Elwert (2018) uses the notion of markets of violence to describe how certain 
accumulative economic logics become dominant after extended conflicts where state 
institutions break down and the monopoly of violence becomes fragmented. In other 
words, while the origins of the conflict might not be economic, the continuation of 
violence is premised on the economic behaviour of various state and non-state 
actors, particularly warlords. The continuing reliance on violence to accumulate 
resources, and thus power, allows militias to govern without the support of the 
majority, thus fatally detracting from accountability. Markets of violence function by 
linking nonviolent commodity markets with the violent acquisition of goods. At the 
same time, the high levels of societal militarization do not translate into peace or 
security for the communities that live there (Tricontinental Institute 2019). In these 
ALS, where states has completely lost their monopoly of violence, violent dynamics 
can become a defining characteristic of the political economy, which inevitably lead 
to the rise of new modes of security provision (Raineri 2019; Wehrey 2018), also called 
hybrid security (Sayigh 2015).  
Nonetheless, those new or hybrid arrangements remain very precarious, and, thus, a 
potential source of risks and threats. In fact, when the possibilities for profit depend 
on actors’ relative ability to exercise violent control of resources and social relations, 
ALS face two main interrelated risks of governance breakdown. First, those 
arrangements may last only a very short time and result in progressive cycles of 
governance breakdown; in other words, war becomes the new normal. This situation 
relates to how long providers of security can maintain their access to resources and 
wealth, and, thus, their political power. The second point links to the question of 
accountability and entails the creation of chains of authoritarianism(s). Even though 
one authoritarian ruler is gone, different, and no less authoritarian, political 
personalities and strongmen succeed each other (ICG 2018) while the country 
remains in a state of ongoing conflict.  
In such contexts, putting an end to the conflict and the imposition of an 
international arms embargo appear to be fundamental conditions for fostering 
societal resilience (Capasso et al. 2019; Capasso 2020). However, the issue of an arms 
embargo cannot be tackled only at the local or regional levels because it requires 
thinking through the role of global actors, including EU member states. In other 
words, external actors can also represent a source of risk and threats to Libya and the 
SN, more generally through the continuing flow of weapons (from European and 
other countries) to regional countries (PAX 2017; Wintour 2019). Germany, for 
instance, has approved arms exports worth €331 million ($358 million) to countries 
accused of supporting warring parties in Libya, according to a report from the 
German Economy Ministry seen by news agency DPA (DW 2020). Similarly, Italy has 
sold a total of €872 million of weapons to Egypt (Rete Italiana per il Disarmo 2020). 










This process raises serious questions with respect to not only Egypt and the UAE’s 
crucial role in the conflict in Libya, but also the diversion of weapons and the 
breaches of arms embargoes (Emirates Leaks 2019; PAX 2017), forcing a 
reconsideration of how war can become a source of profit at the international level. 
Therefore, while, under Qaddafi, Libya had a ruling family that regarded the public 
sector as their private property and treated the armed forces as their guards, multiple 
private armed actors now compete for exclusive control of public properties and 
private businesses. In the absence of a state, predation and capture of national 
resources have reached new and unprecedented levels. 
4. THE CASE OF TUNISIA  
The liberalization of the Tunisian economy, begun by Ben Ali in the late 1980s, had 
highly disruptive consequences for the country since the introduction of market 
forces allowed the ruling elites to consolidate the process of state capture (Tsourapas 
2013; Joya 2017; Brésillon 2020). This process, in fact, led to a significant shift in the 
economy by the end of the 1990s, whereby the inner circles around Ben Ali and his 
wife Leila Trabelsi (Kchouk 2017) started to control investments and private projects 
(Heydemann 2004; Santini 2018). The Trabelsi-Ben Ali clan created a ”networks of 
privilege” system through alliances (i.e., marriages) and obedience (i.e., by 
controlling business associations or sanctioning voices of dissent) in order to 
consolidate their position (Arouri et al. 2019). Ben Ali’s clan managed to establish a 
vast and lucrative business empire, capturing the state through a process of 
perverted privatization accompanied by tax evasion. For instance, in the case of the 
automobile market, the family first appropriated public firms through privatization, 
and the connected firms subsequently experienced a policy-induced surge in 
demand while evading import taxes (Arouri et al. 2019). In the years preceding the 
uprising of 2011, clientelist networks and security forces gained total control of the 
job market, creating a system of distribution of resources that only increased the 
economic divide between the north and south of the country (Meddeb 2017). For 
instance, in the 20 years following the restructuring of the economy in 1985, 10,000 
jobs were suppressed with dramatic effects on job creation and the youth in the 
region (Allal 2010). The 2008 revolt in the Gafsa mining basin, for instance, was 
sparked in January 2008 by a fraudulent recruitment procedure organized by the 
Gafsa Phosphates Company (GPC), which offered coveted jobs in mines re-opened by 
the government to young candidates from outside the region and connected to the 
regime to the disadvantage of the local population (ibid.). Jobs, in fact, would be 
distributed among local patrons and regional administrations according to a quota 
system. In turn, the latter would redistribute these jobs among their clients on a 
tribal or partisan basis, or even sell them to the highest bidder (Meddeb 2017). While 
this system of redistribution of resources was delicately implemented over two 










decades in the Tunisian periphery, it also fuelled the fragmentation of local society, 
consolidating tribal identities and social grievances (ibid.). In addition, local 
residents were left with environmental damage that, in turn, affected agricultural 
production, another important source of income (Ghilès and Woertz 2018). 
Through the economic liberalization of Tunisia, regime elites were slowly 
incorporated into an international capitalist class, although “they were on the 
margins of network of power, in that they extracted rent from the circulation of 
capital (into and out of Tunisia) rather than being at its productive heart” (Murphy 
2017). In other words, the political economy of Tunisia was erected around structural 
hierarchies of power beneficial to the ruling class, thus to powerful political and 
economic elites. This process triggered a dual and interrelated process. On the one 
hand, the formal sector remained under the control of rent-seeking elites who reaped 
the benefits of opening the economy to international capital, which significantly 
affected the distribution of wealth and power within and among the local population. 
Those differences clearly emerged in the imbalance of economic and social reforms 
and developmental policies that the state predominantly implemented in the coastal 
areas and the capital, Tunis, which effectively led to the marginalizing of the other 
regions (Santini 2018). Such disparities not only hindered societal resilience at the 
local level but also led to several rounds of contestation and governance breakdown, 
as was the case in the Gafsa revolt. On the other hand, the gradual capture of the state 
enabled the increasing informalization of the economy, such as a rise in smuggling 
activities in the long-neglected regions in the South. As Santini (2018) argues, the 
emergence of the informal economy in some regions and policy arenas does not 
reflect an attempted but unsuccessful state penetration. Rather, its origin and 
flourishing “epitomizes a rational decision by the Tunisian central authority to 
concentrate investment and resources in areas more economically developed and 
politically more loyal” (Santini 2018: 63). 
The political economy of Tunisia reflected a wider process of reconfiguration and 
modification of governance mechanisms induced by national and international 
transformation (Hibou 2006). While pressures from the international economy 
became more direct, the state increasingly started to delegate its regulatory or even 
sovereign functions to private intermediaries, what Hibou calls “privatization of the 
state” (Hibou 2011). The capacity of the previous regime to carry out those policies lay 
in how it devised a discourse of reformism that, while hiding practices of domination 
and coercion, was heavily invested in a language of negotiation and fighting against 
corruption. The latter emphasized the tradition of listening on the part of Tunisian 
officials and highlighted the consensus around liberalism with a dash of attention to 
the social sphere—in other words, cosmetic changes. This process remained 
untouched by European officials and masked the reality that the regime depended 










on its coercive control over the political apparatus and wider society in order to 
sustain its own survival and enrichment (Hibou et al. 2011). Under the regime of Ben 
Ali, international institutions praised Tunisia for its substantial progress in 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Tunisia enjoyed an annual average gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 5% between 1997 and 2007. It experienced a 
strong recovery following the 2008 global recession and a 3.7% GDP growth in 2010. 
However, growth did not trickle down to large sections of the population, and 
economic grievances and societal discontent ended up playing a significant role in 
fanning the flames of the 2011 revolution. A small incident blew up into a huge 
popular uprising that resulted in the ousting of Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, less than a 
month after mass demonstrations had begun. Tunisia experienced a revolution 
driven in large measure by “structural vulnerabilities” (Magen et al. 2020) related to 
social, economic, and political exclusion. In a poll conducted after the revolution, 
most of the respondents believed that the revolution had been induced by the youth 
(96%), the unemployed (85.3%), and the disadvantaged (87.3%) (SIGMA Group 2011). 
After 2011, Tunisia continued to be praised as a successful revolutionary story. 
However, despite such international praise, the status quo has largely remained the 
same; economic elites have further entrenched their position by hijacking the 
transition process, and unemployment—particularly youth unemployment—is on 
the rise (Schaefer 2018). In other words, the structural vulnerabilities characterising 
Tunisia under Ben Ali have not disappeared, and, thus, the political-economic 
conditions continue to represent a possible source of governance breakdown in the 
country. The transitional government seized the assets of the Ben Ali-affiliated clan, 
resulting in several prosperous state-linked companies being sold in a call for tender 
opened to local investors. While, on the surface, this suggested a restructuring of the 
political economy, the power relations underpinning Tunisia’s economic hierarchies 
have not significantly shifted, and much-needed changes in job creation and the 
conditions of access to the labour market are still lacking. For example, according to 
the Egyptian think tank Economic Research Forum, three car dealerships previously 
under the control of the Ben Ali clan were seized and purchased through an auction 
by factions of the extant business elite (Oubenal and Ben Hamouda 2018). Indicative 
examples of this process are how two notable businessmen, Poulina and Ben Yedder, 
bought the majority shares in the holding company Ennak, while Bouchamaoui and 
Chabchoub became the new main shareholders of City Cars, and the Loukil group 
bought the company Ennakl Vehicules Industriels (ibid.). 
Furthermore, in order to understand the post-2011 rentierization of Tunisia’s 
economy, it is also important to understand how rent-seeking elites can further 
profit vis-à-vis the global economy. In this regard, tax evasion provides an important 
example. By way of illustration, in 2018, employees paid 5,488.4 million dinars in 










taxes, double the amount paid by the companies that employ them (i.e., 2,713.8 
million dinars) (Abderrazek 2020). Furthermore, oil companies only contributed 4% 
of total tax revenue, despite generating very large profits (ibid.). The issue of tax 
evasion also shows the interlinkages between national wealth and global capital 
since Tunisia has been ranked fifty-ninth among the countries with the largest sums 
of money hidden in the accounts of Swiss banks, comprising more than $52 million 
and 256 customers (Sbouai and Khadharaoui 2015). Among them, it is possible to 
identify the same names of the families of the large groups mentioned above, but 
also the name of the ex-first lady of the Trabelsi family. The Panama Papers show 
how big industrial tycoons operate offshore accounts instead, and the documents 
include the names of, for instance, Raouf Bouchamaoui, whose business operations 
range across oil and gas, real estate, and financial services (Ben Hamadi et al. 2016). 
The question of food dependence further shows how the global economy affected the 
process of state capture in Tunisia (Ayeb and Bush 2019). The political lexicon 
concerning the objectives of agricultural policy changed dramatically from the end 
of the 1980s. The integration of Tunisia’s agriculture into the global market created a 
structural food dependence and a general impoverishment of the peasantry that is 
unable to supply its own food security (for a deeper discussion, see Ayeb and Bush 
2019). This shift was based on the reorientation of agricultural, economic, and natural 
resources to the benefit of investment in agribusiness, promoting the interests of 
those who benefitted from state investment in irrigation to the detriment of family 
farming (El Safi 2016). Far from being a simple political slogan, those policies 
produced large-scale changes. Tunisian agricultural strategy no longer focused on 
producing more for those in need but became instead a strategy to produce more to 
export (Ayeb and Bush 2019: 93–122). In such a context, while liberalization of the 
economy has turned out to be a source of profit and wealth for the ruling class, it has 
also acted as a source of potential risks and reduced resilience for those in the lower 
strata. 
The recent EU-Tunisia talks on agricultural agreements could further entrench this 
dynamic of food dependence. While its aims are to capitalize on the comparative 
advantage of Tunisia’s nearly year-round sunshine, forcing a shift toward 
production of fruit and vegetables for export, it also creates a dependence on imports 
for the basic cereals that make up most Tunisian diets. The EU-Tunisia trade 
liberalization agenda (DCFTA) is an example of the inherent risks in opening up the 
local economy to global competition without any form of protectionism for local 
production. This process, in fact, has a tendency to reduce the resilience of a local 
society exposed to the pressures of global markets and competition while allowing 
ruling elites to enrich themselves further. While the agreement brings an increase of 
Tunisian exports—mainly from the sectors of fruits, fish, and olive oil, due to their 










high competitiveness in the EU market, some agri-food subsectors—mainly animal 
products, milk and dairy products, and cereals—remain unprepared to support the 
costs of the DCFTA, due to their low competitiveness (Mergos and Papanastassiou 
2016). While Tunisian authorities could propose a progressive trade liberalization 
strategy with the EU or encourage foreign direct investment in these sectors to 
improve their competitiveness, one main risk remains. As past studies have shown, 
such trade models lead to the development of a dual agricultural market, further 
marginalising small producers for the benefit of local elites and European exporters 
(Kourtelis 2015). 
5. DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN FINDINGS  
It is possible to identify two main findings in relation to the cases discussed above. 
First, state capture, cronyism, and predatory economic behaviour by the ruling class 
is rampant and endemic in the SN, and it comes with huge social and political costs 
for the population. As the 2011 protests in the SN region showed, political-economic 
factors represented a major issue of concern. The lack of jobs and deteriorating 
economic conditions acted as a potent fuel for popular protests, which then turned 
into governance breakdown. Therefore, state capture remains a possible source of 
risks in the SN, since many of the structural vulnerabilities remain unaddressed. The 
major problems are linked to the widespread corruption, poor implementation of the 
rule of law, and lack of transparency. Private and public actors often collude to 
manipulate the rules of the political game in order to accumulate wealth and/or 
acquire personal benefits. In the SN, the corrupt practices of dividing the spoils of 
public office have become institutionalized. Moreover, as Kakachia and Lebanidze 
(2020: 37) have pointed out, social orders based on state-capture can be stable, as long 
as they provide the population with basic goods and services. However, should an 
economic deterioration take place as a result of a global economic downturn, social 
orders based on state capture could reach a tipping point and contribute to popular 
uprisings, violence, or governance breakdown.  
More specifically, based on the case study on Libya, it is possible to note how the 
collapse of statehood has produced an increasing formation of ALS, now under the 
control of non-state actors. In fact, the ensuing possibility to access sources of 
income linked to the previous regime has given rise to different levels of governance 
breakdown. In Libya, the collapse of the central authorities has heightened reliance 
on predatory economic practices, which, in turn, have come at the expense of the 
local population. Therefore, while dynamics of state capture and crony capitalism 
existed before the protests, they have now exponentially increased because one of 
the key sectors normally under the control of the state—that is, the monopoly of 
violence—is now also up for grabs. Non-state actors aggressively compete to capture 










national resources, while simultaneously shaping the creation of a lacking central 
authority. The case of Tunisia further demonstrate the existence of state capture and 
cronyism by wealthy elites and how this process undermines the political process 
where elites take advantage of their power and connections at the official level 
through the use of arbitrary justice and media. 
The second important finding is the role played by the global economy in 
contributing to the consolidation of these dynamics of state capture. The norms 
governing arms control and non-proliferation are eroding, and there is “a risk of 
increased weapons of mass destruction … and of a renewed arms race between 
superpowers” (Magen et al. 2019: 31). For instance, in Libya, the international sale of 
military equipment and weaponry to regional players further creates the conditions 
for war in the SN. In Libya, militias and warlords acquire military equipment to make 
territorial and military gains on the ground. These same groups then compete in 
extracting resources from the local population, particularly in lucrative sectors. In 
this process, it is important to understand how warlords and militias display the 
capacity to extract profit in conjunction with global actors, undoing all the links of 
accountability with the local population and the national economy. In the case of 
Tunisia, tax evasion further shows how wealthy elites can relocate their capital 
abroad, avoiding investing it in the national economy. The discussion of food 
dependence also illustrates the potential risks for countries in the SN when opening 
up their economies to the global market. In the case of Tunisian agriculture, political 
and economic strategies focused more on the production of exports than in 
satisfying those strata of the population in need of food. In such a context, while the 
liberalization of the economy has provided opportunities to make a profit, it did so 
only for agri-business and wealthy elites. At the same time, it has had a negative 
impact on the more marginalized strata of society, further increasing existing socio-
economic inequalities. 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THINKING ABOUT RESILIENCE 
The evidence shows that the deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the SN are a 
source of risks and potential threats, including governance breakdown. As this paper 
has argued, the roots of these conditions are related to the presence of state-capture 
and cronyism that sustain the ruling class and wealthy elites, and a political 
economic structure that allows them to acquire political and economic capital. The 
first case showed how rent-seeking elites tend to rely on the simultaneous use of 
public and private means to maintain their power and adjust the political game in 
their favour, thus pursuing strategies of control via networks of privilege. The lack of 
income-generating opportunities pushes people into involvement in the system of 
patronage and clientelism via, for instance, jobs in the public sector. In fact, there is a 










widespread perception that nepotism and corruption play a role in the allocation of 
public jobs in the SN, which reflects the potential of such allocations to be used as 
discretionary tools of political patronage, creating further inequalities in access 
(Hertog 2017).  
A central challenge facing countries in the SN today is the urgent need to renegotiate 
a more just, inclusive, and sustainable social contract between the state and its 
citizens. Re-establishing trust in the institutions of the state and developing new 
national narratives to rally the population around promises for a better future will be 
key to this gradual healing of the rupture between states and societies. While the re-
structuring of the social contract is going to require acknowledgement by the EU, the 
solutions to the above challenges can only be effective if they are home-grown and 
not imposed from afar, or top-down in the absence of public engagement and 
oversight (Ranj Alaaldin et al. 2017). Restructuring the social contract in the SN will, 
in turn, also depend on: 1) accounting for the responsibility of capital towards 
society, thus promoting reforms that aim to curb the process of state capture; 2) 
regulating the links between national wealth and the global economy; and 3) 
empowering the rights of those at the lower margin of society, particularly those 
involved in the informal sectors. In the SN countries, it is not currently only the 
states that fail to mediate the interests of their populations vis-à-vis capital, thus 
favouring personal gains and rent-seeking activities that inevitably deteriorate 
governance. The failure of the state and the ruling class is further exacerbated by its 
integration into the global economy. In such a situation, increasing resilience means 
strengthening local ownership (by the population and societal actors) and weakening 
the monopolies of elite-driven global transactional policies that appear to produce 
more inequality. 
For instance, the Tunisian state has attempted to fight the role of the rent-seeking 
elites via reforms aiming to tackle public administration and corruption, yet, in both 
cases, they were met by strong resistance from vested interest groups who feared 
that their political and financial interests were at risk of being undermined. The next 
problem is a lack of “vertical trust” (Börzel and Risse 2016), not only in the 
effectiveness and neutrality of local institutions and procedures, but in the state. As a 
key component of societal resilience (see Cadier et al. 2020), a lack of vertical trust 
weakens the capacity of society, as many disappointments caused by several 
coalitions and governments of different political orientations produce apathy toward 
political institutions. Of course, people continue to vote in elections, but it becomes 
more of a habit than a civic act of political engagement. To strengthen societal 
resilience to state capture, it is important to support civil society, independent media, 
and NGOs working on human rights, transparency, and democracy, which then 
reinforces vertical trust. 










The case of Tunisia is emblematic because it shows how crucial political will is to the 
success of any development/reform-focused effort. While many development 
agencies today are attempting to sidestep political inertia by de-centralising their aid 
and granting local initiatives preference over a state-centred framework (Giusti 
2020), studies (Platteau 2003; Banks et al. 2015) show that these grass-roots 
approaches remain of little avail in the absence of political will. Influential civil 
society representatives frequently replicate state capture locally. A successful 
example of increasing societal resilience at the level of institutional design with 
spill-over effects on social trust might be the Bolivian Renta Dignidad (Dignity 
Pension) programme, introduced in 2008 to protect the basic income of all people 
aged 60 years and older. This universal non-contributory solidarity pension 
increased non-conditional cash transfers to the older population by over 100%, 
reaching over 800,000 beneficiaries by 2010, 55% of whom were women and 83% of 
whom did not previously receive any income or pension. By 2013, the scheme had 
reached 97% of the total eligible beneficiaries. One effect was a 5.8% reduction in 
extreme poverty by 2009, particularly in rural areas (Gonzales 2011). While the 
demographic configurations of countries across the SN vary, such a reform program 
could help strengthen social trust toward the institutional design and help reduce 
economic inequalities. 
Undoubtedly, more egalitarian rent, land, and resource distributions redressing the 
dispossession of the working population represent the necessary conditions for 
effective demand enhancement and a successful development strategy. However, for 
those policies to succeed, it should be remembered that the success of whatever 
programmes are introduced will heavily depend on the macro environment; 
otherwise, they will be short lived and doomed to failure. Economic development 
depends on autonomy over policy, resource recirculation within the economy, and 
an adequate interface between policies and outcomes. These, in turn, also depend on 
weakening the links between national wealth and the global economy. In the case of 
Libya, there has been a proposal to facilitate and support the establishment of a 
Libyan-requested, Libyan-led International Financial Commission (Pack 2019). While 
this might seem to be a feasible option, it is not clear how it could be implemented in 
the absence of control on the arms industry and the flow of weapons to various local 
political actors. Similarly, Tunisian decision-makers could pursue reforms that 
would limit exports and invest in sustainable and responsible agriculture, which 
considers the right to food and food sovereignty, enabling people to have the right to 
define and control their own local food systems. In other words, the EU could support 
safeguard measures by developing countries to protect local markets from cheap 
imports, although this would also entail placing limits on the EU’s own export-
oriented agricultural policies. While it remains unclear whether the EU is ready to 










rethink those policies, it is vital to assess in advance and carefully monitor the 
implementation and impacts of trade agreements on employment and social, as well 
as environmental, rights (Alternative Trade Mandate 2014). 
The case of Tunisia under Ben Ali, for instance, shows how the regime was, for many 
years, capable of devising a discourse of reformism while hiding practices of 
domination and marginalization of the lower strata of society who remained largely 
unknown to European officials. In such situations, unrestricted foreign direct 
investment should not be considered a magic bullet that automatically benefits host 
countries. Rather, it is necessary to understand how globalization can enrich certain 
classes while further impoverishing others. Strengthening resilience at the local 
level also requires rethinking the question of tax evasion in the SN, an issue 
intimately linked to the global economy. In fact, if globalization means ever-lower 
taxes for its main winners—the owners of big multinational companies—and ever-
higher taxes for those it leaves out—working-class families—then it probably has no 
future (Saez and Zucman 2019). Tax havens, in this regard, are the emblematic 
example of antisocial and illegal activity that disproportionately impacts the poor. 
Concerted action by the EU—together with the UN, IMF, and OECD—could be taken 
to tackle this issue in developing and developed countries and achieve a fairer 
distribution of wealth. Big business and multinational corporations could be 
regulated by the creation of improved accounting standards to show what is being 
done offshore and by whom , while also taxing profits on an international basis 
(Murphy 2005). This would help ensure countries can retain within their economies 
the profits and tax revenues that are vital to their development by removing the 
incentive for them to be taken offshore. Moreover, the process of automatic 
information exchange that the EU has pioneered could, and should, be extended 
internationally and must carry economic sanctions for any country that refuses to 
participate.7  
Otherwise, as recent research has shown (Broz et al. 2019; Milner 2019; Crouch 2018), 
there are significant risks that more and more individuals and voters, falsely 
convinced that globalization and fairness are two incompatible phenomena, will fall 
prey to protectionist and xenophobic politicians, eventually destroying globalization 
itself (Cox 2017). Populist leaders claim to offer policies combining strongly 
nationalist and anti-democratic practices, as seen in countries such as Hungary and 
                                               
7
  A 2019 EU parliamentary committee report showed that seven of the European Union’s own member 
states—including Ireland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—behave like tax havens. Despite this, 
other EU institutions, including the European Commission and EU Council, have so far refused to 
acknowledge that any of the EU’s member states are tax havens (European Parliament News 2019). 










Poland (Milner 2019). More widely, these are direct challenges to the liberal 
international order (Crouch 2018). In his most recent work, Piketty (2020) further 
highlights how today’s identity politics and increasing economic protectionism are 
being fuelled by the lack of an internationalist egalitarian platform. Therefore, 
protectionism and populism are not the substitute for welfare-oriented policies at 
the global level. For these reasons, the EU approach to social and local forms of 
resilience should also emphasize the importance of global reforms to positively 
affect the SN, thereby promoting a new international political-economic model. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The political economies of many states in the SN are dominated by processes of state 
capture that have been enabled and supported by the poor condition of political-
economic institutions, as well as by their integration into the global economy. Rent-
seeking elites capture the authority of the state by exercising disproportionate 
influence over the institutional design governing not only economic activities and 
transactions but also political accountability of the state vis-à-vis the population. 
Such processes of accumulation of wealth and unequal redistribution of resources to 
the population show an increasing tendency to generate endemic and rampant 
corruption, poor implementation of the rule of law, and a lack of transparency. 
Private and public actors often collude to manipulate the rules of the political game 
to accumulate wealth and/or acquire personal benefits. Moreover, these same elites 
benefit the most from the opening up of their domestic economies to global markets, 
which in turn has contributed to substantively reducing the capacity of states to 
deliver goods and services to their respective populations. In this regard, it is 
possible to say that state capture, as a process, plays a very important role in the 
creation of ALS. The uprisings and protests over the last decade have not necessarily 
put an end to state capture but rather triggered a re-configuration of the 
participating elites who, nonetheless, continue to rig the political game in their 
favour. In Libya, dynamics of state capture have now exponentially increased 
because one of the key sectors normally under the control of the state—that is, the 
monopoly of violence—is now also up for grabs. Non-state actors aggressively 
compete to capture national resources while simultaneously shaping the creation of 
a weak or absent central authority. In Tunisia, the fall of the Ben Ali regime did not 
translate into an undoing of these structural imbalances that characterised the 
political economy of the country before 2011. Popular discontent remains high, as the 
ongoing protests in the country further prove. State capture, therefore, remains a 
possible source of risks and threats in the SN since many of the structural 
vulnerabilities have remained unaddressed. Moreover, should an economic 
deterioration take place as a result of a global economic downturn, the outbreak of 
popular uprisings and violence, and thus governance breakdown, is highly likely. 










Any policy intervention should simultaneously aim to address the structural 
problems of state capture, while creating more secure and safer job opportunities 
and working conditions for those who are engaged in these sectors. Those insights 
appear to be even more relevant considering the current Covid-19 crisis, which has 
reinforced already-existing social and economic inequality in several ways. Lower 
paid workers involved in informal economies are at a higher risk of becoming 
infected than the wealthy. They also are exposed to a significantly higher mortality 
risk because pre-existing medical conditions are unevenly distributed within 
societies (Powers 2020). Well-paid jobs can often be continued by working from 
home, whereas millions of low-wage workers, often engaged in informal economies, 
only receive payment for short-term work or unemployment compensation, which 
leads them to suffer severe losses (ILO 2020). All these phenomena widen and 
aggravate the social divide. 
To strengthen societal resilience, it is essential to continue promoting reforms at the 
institutional level that aim to improve transparency, accountability, and the rule of 
law. However, resilience at the local level cannot be fostered without addressing 
global challenges. There is a concrete danger that local problems in the SN will 
persist if the link between how capital is governed globally and shared locally 
remains unaddressed. The paper has pointed out three issues: trade policies 
(particularly in relation to agriculture), tax evasion, and the international trade in 
weapons. These three dynamics further sustain processes of state capture in the SN. 
Considering the rising tide of populism and protectionism at the global level, it is 
suggested that the EU act more proactively in the promotion of a new international 
political-economic model that could regulate the rights and responsibilities of local 
and international capital in the interest of all.  
Finally, by reflecting on the role that the intimate linkages between the global 
neoliberal economy and countries in the SN, the paper reflects on whether the 
definition of ALS requires going beyond a purely Weberian definition of statehood to 
incorporate having a monopoly on violence and distribution of goods and services 
and takes the process of circulation of capital at the global level into account. In fact, 
as we have seen, those interlinkages cannot be underestimated, and they should be 
kept in mind when thinking about sources of risks, threats, and resilience in the 
cases of Libya and Tunisia.  
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